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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Case No. 20020594-SC 
v. 
ANGIE BRAKE, 
Defendant/Petitioner. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in 
State v. Brake, 2002 UT App 190, 51 P.3d 31 {"Brake") (attached at Addendum A). The 
Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Whether the investigating deputy's opening the door of defendant's car without a 
warrant was reasonably justified by a concern for his personal safety. 
"On certiorari review, this Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not the 
trial court, for correctness and without deference to its conclusions. State v. James, 2000 UT 
80, \ 8, 13 P.3d 576 (citations omitted). "The correctness of the court of appeals' decision 
turns on whether that court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the 
appropriate standard of review." Id. The trial court's factual findings underlying its decision 
to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error. State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 939 n.4 (Utah 1994); accord State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 8, 6 P.3d 1133. 
The trial court's conclusions of law based on those findings are reviewed for correctness, 
"with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the 
facts." Pena, 869 P.2d at 936-39; accord Veteto, 2000 UT 62, at 1f 8. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Angie Brake, was charged with possession or use of cocaine, a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 
1999) (Count I), and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(a) (1998) (Count II) (R. 8). Following a preliminary 
hearing, the trial court bound defendant over on both charges (R. 19-20). Defendant moved 
to suppress the investigating deputy's discovery of contraband and defendant's statements 
allegedly received in violation of Miranda (R. 29-40). * The trial court denied the motion with 
respect to the discovery of the contraband and granted the motion with respect to the alleged 
Miranda violation (R. 57-64). Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a 
controlled substance, conditioning her plea on the right to appeal the trial court's partial denial 
1
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct 1602 (1966). 
2 
of her motion to suppress. The trial court dismissed Count II, charging possession of 
paraphernalia (R. 76-83). The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory one-year term, 
but suspended the sentence and placed defendant on probation (R. 86-88). Defendant timely 
appealed (R. 95). 
On direct appeal, a divided panel of the court of appeals upheld the trial court's denial 
of defendant's motion to suppress evidence. Brake, 2002 UT App 190, atf 26. Recognizing 
that the deputy's opening the front passenger door for a legitimate governmental purpose in 
circumstances reasonably giving rise to concerns for his safety, the court distinguished this 
case from those involving a weapons search. Id. at f^ f 12-17. Instead, the court adopted the 
balancing analysis used in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986), wherein the United States 
Supreme Court found that a legitimate governmental interest in a vehicle's identification 
number (VIN) and a generalized concern for officer safety justified a minimal intrusion into 
the car's interior. Id. at fflf 18-22. Analogizing the law enforcement's right to ready access 
to a VIN to the government's interest in securing the driver's license in this case, the court 
concluded that to the extent the opening of the door was a "search," it was a minimal intrusion 
justified by a legitimate government interest, including officer safety. Id. at fflf 23-26, f 26 
n.5. 
Based on its reading of the record, the dissent argued that the deputy's intrusion into 
the car was a weapons search, unjustified by a reasonable belief that defendant was armed and 
dangerous. Id. at fflf 28-31 (Orme, J., dissenting). 
3 
STATEMENT OF THF FACTS2 
At approximately 11:45 p.m. on January 29, 2000, Utah County Deputy Sheriff Neil 
Castleberry was patrolling in Pleasant Grove, west of the Geneva Steel plant, when he noticed 
a small green Nissan car and a white Chevrolet pickup truck pulled off the road in a small 
pullout (R. 102:6, 8-9 14-15, 33). It was dark outside and cold (R. 102:8, 31). Without 
turning on his emergency lights, he pulled in behind them and stopped his car to inquire 
whether anyone needed assistance (R. 102:15). He first approached the Nissan and asked the 
driver to roll down her window. She complied. In response to the deputy's questions, the 
driver, a young woman, admitted she was only fifteen years old and that she did not have a 
driver's license (R. 102:15-16,31). The driver also claimed that she had not been driving (R. 
102:31). In answer to the deputy's request about who owned the car, the driver said the owner 
was in the back seat (R. 102:16). He tried to look into the interior, but the windows were 
fogged and it was difficult to see, although he could make out a male and a female (R. 102:16, 
31-32). 
Deputy Castleberry stepped to the driver's side rear door, but because that window 
was also fogged he opened the door to speak with the owner (R. 120:16,32). He spoke with 
defendant, attempting to identify the owner of the car and why there was a fifteen-year-old 
sitting in the driver's seat after the 11:30 p.m. curfew (R. 102:17, 37). Defendant identified 
2
 The facts are recited "in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings." 
State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App, 1997) (reviewing denial of motion to 
suppress). The facts are taken from testimony given at the preliminary hearing, over 
which the trial judge presided and upon which the trial court's ruling is based (R. 64, 
102). 
4 
herself as the owner of the Nissan (R: 102:17). Defendant also claimed that she and her 
friends were all from Sanpete County, that she had driven to their present location quite some 
time earlier, and that afterward the fifteen-year-old and she had changed seats (R. 102:17,33). 
Defendant also told the deputy that her identification was in her purse, pointing to the front 
seat (R. 102:17, 33, 38). Defendant offered to retrieve the purse, but Deputy Castleberry 
declined the offer (R. 35). 
Deputy Castleberry testified that he was concerned for his safety at this point (R. 
102:18). He explained that he was a lone officer in an isolated area known for frequent 
criminal activity, late at night, with five people to deal with, at least one of whom was a 
fifteen-year-old juvenile. He also had to deal with the occupants of two different vehicles, 
three in the Nissan car and two in the pickup truck, neither of whom he had yet seen (R. 
102:18,33-34,43-44). With his safety in mind, he walked around the rear of the Nissan and 
opened the front passenger door to retrieve the purse so that he could hand it to defendant, 
making sure that there were not any weapons around the purse (R. 102:17-18, 35). Deputy 
Castleberry saw a purse on the front passenger seat (R. 102:18, 36).3 Deputy Castleberry 
specifically stated that he did not want anyone else reaching into the area of the purse without 
his control (R. 102:18). As he reached for the purse he noticed a small white bindle 
containing a white powdery substance on the seat next to the purse, near the car's console (R. 
102:18-19). The bindle was in plain view, readily seen even without moving the purse (R. 
3
 In fact, as noted below, Deputy Castleberry actually picked up the purse of 
another member of defendant's group. Somewhat later, he found defendant's purse, 
which was also around the front seat (R. 102:38-39). 
5 
19-20, 36). From his experience and training in drug recognition, Deputy Castleberry 
immediately suspected that the bindle contained a controlled substance (R. 102:36-37). 
When Deputy Castleberry picked up the purse and asked about its owner, someone said 
that it belonged to "Lilly" (R. 102:43). When he asked where Lilly was, he was directed to 
the pickup truck (R. 102:43). Concerned about having his back to the pickup truck, which he 
had not yet investigated, Deputy Castleberry carried the purse and the bindle to the pickup 
truck, opened the door, and asked for Lilly and whether the purse belonged to her (R. 102:43-
44). Lilly acknowledged the purse was hers, out denied any knowledge of the bindle. Deputy 
Castleberry then escorted her to his patrol car where he interviewed her and tested the bindle 
(R. 102:43, 45). The bindle tested positive for cocaine (R. 102:19-20, 43). Deputy 
Castleberry returned to defendant's car and asked all three occupants who owned the cocaine 
(R. 102:20,37). He received no response from anyone, including defendant (R. 102:20,37). 
At some point in his investigation, Deputy Castleberry checked four of the five individuals, 
including defendant, for signs of cocaine use and concluded that all four exhibited signs of 
cocaine use (R. 102:45-46). 
Although Deputy Castleberry acknowledged on cross-examination that defendant was 
not free to leave, he did not consider defendant to be in custody at this point, nor had he 
arrested her because he had not yet determined "what was going on" - - he did not know who 
owned the cocaine. Consequently, Deputy Castleberry had not yet read defendant her 
Miranda rights (R. 102:20-21, 42). Unable to determine who owned the cocaine after 
questioning defendant and another occupant, the deputy informed defendant that because, as 
6 
owner, she was responsible for what was inside her car, he would arrest her if no one claimed 
ownership of the cocaine (R. 102:20-21). Defendant then admitted that the cocaine belonged 
to her and that she and her companions had been using the cocaine found in her car 
throughout that evening (R. 102:21-22, 28, 47). Deputy Castleberry took defendant into 
custody. He did not give defendant a Miranda warning, nor did he further question her (R. 
102:22). 
Deputy Shawn Chipman arrived in response to Deputy Castleberry5s call for backup 
and learned from Deputy Castleberry that he had found drugs in the defendant's car (R. 102:5-
6, 28-29,42). At Deputy Castleberry's direction, Deputy Chipman searched the passenger 
compartment of the car for additional evidence incident to an impending arrest of either 
defendant or one of her party (R. 102:6,42). On a ledge against the rear window, also in plain 
view, he found a tin cannister containing some residue, a clear baggy, a plastic straw, and a 
razor blade (R. 102:6-7, 11-13, 19, 40-41). Deputy Chipman gave the cannister and its 
contents to Deputy Castleberry (R. 102:12). Defendant admitted that the container and its 
contents also belonged to her (R. 102:22,27). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals correctly recognized that the circumstances of this case were 
analogous to those in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986), wherein the 
United States Supreme Court upheld a minimal intrusion into a vehicle based on a legitimate 
governmental interest in securing a vehicle identification number and generalized concerns 
for officer safety in traffic stops. Applying Class, the court of appeals recognized that the 
7 
investigating deputy had a legitimate interest in securing defendant's identification to 
investigate her culpability in allowing an underage, unlicensed individual to operate her 
vehicle. Additionally, the deputy had more than a generalized concern for his safety based 
on the circumstances of his encounter: he was alone in a dark, remote, high crime area, and 
dealing with multiple persons and vehicles into which he could not see. In accord with Class 
and other relevant cases, the court of appeals correctly concluded that the deputy's mere 
retrieval of a purse from an area over which he had no immediate control was not a weapons 
search, but rather a minimal intrusion, justified by the circumstances of the encounter. 
ARGUMENT 
THE INVESTIGATING DEPUTY'S OPENING THE DOOR OF 
DEFENDANT'S CAR WITHOUT A WARRANT WAS A MINIMAL 
INTRUSION JUSTIFIED BY A LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENTAL 
INTEREST AND IN CIRCUMSTANCES GIVING RISE TO A 
CONCERN FOR PERSONAL SAFETY 
Defendant claims that the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's denial 
of her motion to suppress by concluding that the deputy's retrieval of a purse was a minimal 
intrusion, justified by legitimate governmental interests and concern for officer safety, under 
New Yorkv. Class, 475 U.S. 106,106 S. Ct. 960 (1986). Aplt Br. at 9-10. Instead, defendant 
argues the court of appeals should have recognized that the retrieval of the purse was a 
"weapons search," unsupported by reasonable suspicion that defendant was dangerous and 
might obtain immediate control of a weapon. Aplt. Br. at 10-12, The claim fails to recognize 
that the court of appeals correctly distinguished a search for weapons from the deputy's 
limited intrusion to control the spae; around the purse. Defendant also fails to recognize that, 
8 
in accord with Class, the deputy sought information in which defendant had only a very 
limited expectation of privacy in the uniquely dangerous circumstances of automobile stops. 
A, The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is reasonableness. 
"Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-regulated status, persons 
traveling in vehicles have a lesser expectation of privacy than they would have within a 
private dwelling." James, 2000 UT 80, f 10 (citations omitted). "Although a person has a 
lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does not lose the protection 
of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile." State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, f 8, 
17 P.3d 1135 (quoting State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989) (citation 
omitted)). However, "[t]he Fourth Amendment is not... a guarantee against all searches and 
seizures, but only against unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Sharpe, 470 
U.S. 675, 681 (1985). "The touchstone of [an] analysis under the Fourth Amendment is 
always 'the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular government invasion of 
a citizen's personal security/" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (per 
curiam) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). There is "no ready test for 
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the 
invasion which the search [or seizure] entails." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 
534-35,536-37(1967). 
B. The court of appeals correctly recognized that 
New York v. Class governed the disposition of this case. 
Defendant challenges the court of appeals reliance on New York v. Class, to conclude 
that Deputy Castleberry improperly searched her car to retrieve a purse. Specifically, 
9 
defendant distinguishes Class because the search in that case was for a vehicle identification 
number, an item in which the driver has very little expectation of privacy, and because the 
driver in Class, unlike this case, was stopped for a traffic violation. Aplt. Br. at 10. 
Defendant fails to recognize, however, that the outcome in Class was not dependent on the 
specific features of the search in that case, but rather on the balancing of the government's 
legitimate interests against the nature and extent of the intrusion entailed in the search. Class, 
475 U.S. at 116-17,106 S. Ct at 967 (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523,534-
35, 536-37 (1967)). That balancing of interests in this case supports the court of appeals 
ruling affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence. See 
Brake, 2002 UT App 190, at J 18 ("In Class, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
minimally intrusive warrantless search was justified in light of the Fourth Amendment 
protection against unreasonable searches when balanced against concerns for police safety."). 
In New York v. Class, the United States Supreme Court upheld an officer's discovery 
of a weapon following a minimally intrusive search to locate information the officer had i 
right to view and in which the driver had only a minimal expectation of privacy, after the 
driver committed a traffic offense and the police were exposed to the generalized danger 
inherent in traffic stops. Class, 475 U.S. at 116-19, 106 S. Ct. at 967-69 (1986). 
In Class, the investigating officer legitimately stopped the defendant's car for speeding 
and a broken windshield Class, 475 U.S. at 108,106 S. Ct. at 962-63. The driver exited his 
car and approached one of the officers, producing a registration and proof of insurance, but 
stating he did not have a driver's license. Id. The other officer went directly to the car an*. 
10 
opened the door to look for the vehicle identification number (VIN), required by federal law 
to be displayed on the doorjamb and in plain view beneath the windshield. Id. at 108, 112, 
106 S. Ct. at 962-65. Because the VIN on the dashboard was covered by papers, the officer 
moved them. While doing so, he saw the handle of a gun beneath the driver's seat and 
promptly arrested the driver. Id. at 108, 106 S. Ct at 963. 
Recognizing that the officer's entry into the car to move the papers on the dashboard 
to see the VIN constituted a "search," see id. at 115, 106 S. Ct. at 966, the Court in Class 
applied a balancing test to determine whether the search was "unreasonable." Id. 116, 106 
S. Ct. at 967. The Court first noted that the VIN serves important safety and regulatory 
interests and that because the law required that it be openly displayed a vehicle owner had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN, allowing police officers to demand access to 
it. Id. at 114-15,106 S. Ct. at 966. The Court then noted that concerns for officer safety in 
routine traffic stops authorized the police to direct the movements of a driver "even though 
they lack any particularized reason for believing the driver possesses a weapon'" Id. at 115, 
106 S. Ct. at 967 (emphasis added) (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111,98 S. Ct. at 333 (inherent 
danger of traffic stops authorizes police to order driver from vehicle lawfully stopped for 
observed traffic offense). Thus, the Court found that allowing the respondent to return to his 
car and move the papers covering the VIN would frustrate precisely the objective in securing 
officer safety that Mimms sought to advance. Id. at 116,106 S. Ct. at 967. Finally, the Court 
observed that when, as in the instant case, "the officer's safety is less directly served by the 
detention [to justifiably search for weapons], something more than objectively justifiable 
11 
suspicion is necessary to justify the intrusion if the balance is to tip in favor of the legality of 
the governmental intrusion. Id. at 117, 106 S. Ct. at 967. The Court noted that all three 
factors present in Mimms, justifying a balancing of governmental interests against the 
governmental intrusion, were present in the instant case: "[T]he safety of the officers was 
served by the governmental intrusion; the intrusion was minimal; and the search stemmed 
from some probable cause focusing suspicion on the individual affected by the search." Id. 
at 117-18,106 S. Ct. at 968. The court concluded its analysis, stating: 
[Balancing [the] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's 
Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental 
interests alleged to justify the intrusion/'... the intrusion in this case was 
permissible. . . . [T]he governmental interest in highway safety served by 
obtaining the VIN is of the first order, and the particular method of obtaining 
the VIN here was justified by a concern for the officer's safety. The search was 
focused in its objective and no more intrusive than necessary to fulfill that 
objective,... [i.e.,] little more intrusive than a demand that respondent - under 
the eyes of the officers - move the papers himself. The VIN, which was the 
clear initial objective of the officer, is by law present . . . in plain view of 
someone outside the automobile [and so not] subject to an expectation of 
privacy. The officer here checked both [locations where the VIN was required 
to be displayed], and only those two locations. The officer did not root about 
the interior of respondent's automobile before proceeding to examine the VIN. 
.. When he did intrude, the officer simply reached directly for the unprotected 
space where the VIN was located to move the offending papers. 
Id. at 118-19, 106 S. Ct. at 968 (citations omitted). 
Quoting from Class, the court of appeals stated: 
[Tjhis search was sufficiently unintrusive to be constitutionally permissible in 
light of the lack of reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN and the fact 
that the officers observed respondent commit two traffic violations. Any other 
conclusion would expose police officers to potentially grave risks without 
significantly reducing the intrusiveness of the ultimate conduct-viewing the 
VIN-which, as we have said, the officers were entitled to do as part of an 
undoubtedly justified traffic stop. 
12 
Brake, 2002 UT App. 190, at^22 (quoting Class, 475 U.S. at 119, 106 S. Ct. at 968). 
The court of appeals found the factual and legal components of the analysis in Class 
analogous to this case. Applying Class, the court of appeals noted that the deputy had found 
an underage, unlicensed driver behind the wheel of a car that he believed was running, a 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-8-1(1) (1998). Brake, 2002 UT App 190, at ^23-23.4 
Given at least reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, that defendant was criminally 
culpable in permitting an underage, unlicensed driver to operate her vehicle, the court 
correctly concluded that the deputy's request for defendant's license was "justifiable and 
reasonable," '"in light of the governmental interest in removing unlicensed drivers from the 
road for public safety reasons."' Id. (quoting State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1203 (Utah 
1995) and citing Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-165 (1998)).5 See James, 2000 UT 80, at f 10 
("Under the [automobile] exception to the warrant rule, officers may temporarily detain a 
vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the purpose of 
4
 Defendant also claims that the court of appeals erroneously found that 
defendant's vehicle was running, apparently to challenge the legitimacy of the officer's 
request to see defendant's license based on her violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-165 
(1998). Aplt. Br. at 8-9. However, the court of appeals merely restated the finding of 
the trial court that the deputy "thought defendant's car was probably running," see R. 
63, 14, a finding neither challenged in the trial court nor on direct appeal. Moreover, 
the record does not show the trial court's finding to be clearly erroneous. Deputy 
Castleberry testified that although he knew the pickup truck was running, he could not 
be sure that defendant's car also was running. Further, the deputy's comment was 
made in response to a question that suggested that the deputy had indicated in his 
affidavit in support of probable cause that both vehicles were running (R. 102:29-30). 
5
 Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-165 (1998), states "It is unlawful for the owner . . . of 
any vehicle . . . knowingly to permit the operation of such vehicle upon a highway in 
any manner contrary to law." 
13 
conducting a limited investigation of the suspicion/'). Thus, Deputy Castleberry's authority 
to access defendant's license was fully comparable to the authority of officer in Class to view 
the VIN. See Class, 475 U.S. at 115, 106 S. Ct. at 966 («[W]e have no difficulty in 
concluding that a demand in inspect the VIN, like a demand to see license and registration 
papers, is within the scope of police authority pursuant to a traffic stop.") (emphasis added). 
In short, at the point at which Deputy Castleberry determined that defendant had to be 
investigated for allowing an unlicensed driver to operate her vehicle, defendant no longer had 
any reasonable expectation of privacy in her driver's license. 
Given the circumstances confronting the deputy that gave rise to a concern for his 
safety and a basis for locating defendant's license and finding them analogous to those in 
Class, the deputy was "both justified and reasonable" in his decision to retrieve defendant's 
purse. Id. at % 24. Upholding the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress, the 
court concluded that 
[w jhen Castleberry set out to retrieve the purse, "[tjhe search was focused in its 
objective and no more intrusive than necessary to fulfill that objective." Class, 
475U.S.at 118,106S.Ct.at968. As in Class, Castleberry did not "root about the 
interior of [Brake's vehicle]/' Id. Further, "[Castleberry] did not reach into any 
compartments or open any containers." Id. Ultimately, Castleberry's "safety 
[and a legitimate public safety concern] wfere] served by the [minimal] 
governmental intrusion," 
Id. at ^ 26 (quoting Classy 475 U.S. at 117,106 S. Ct. at 968). Indeed, while not referenced by 
the court of appeals, the balance in favor of the search was still greater in this case than in 
Class because, prior to the search, the circumstances far more emphatically gave rise to a 
concern for officer safety. In Class, the Court found that the generalized risk to police 
14 
officers conducting traffic stops sufficiently tipped the balance to uphold the search. In this 
case, the court of appeals identified specific concerns which justifiably led Deputy Castleberry 
to be concerned for his safety and to personally retrieve the purse: (1) the deputy approached 
two vehicles, both of which he believed to be running, in an isolated, frequent crime area; (2) 
a fifteen-year-old minor, without a driver's license, was sitting in the driver's seat of 
defendant's car; (3) darkness and the vehicle's foggy windows prevented the deputy from 
viewing the vehicle's occupants; (4) the two vehicles were occupied by five individuals; (5) 
the purse was located in a dark area out of the deputy's control Brake, 2002 UT App 190, 
at f 25.6 Thus, any lack of probable cause to arrest defendant for allowing an unlicensed 
driver to operate a vehicle, an offense for which there was more than ample reasonable 
suspicion, is amply balanced by "particularized" concerns for officer safety. 
6
 Defendant disputes that Deputy Castleberry was genuinely concerned for his 
safety because he failed to call for backup until after the "search of the vehicle." Aplt. Br. 
at 9. However, the "search of the vehicle," by which defendant evidently means the 
retrieval of the purse, followed almost immediately after Deputy Castleberry encountered 
the occupants in defendant's car, a point at which he had not yet even identified the 
persons he was dealing with (R. 102:15-19). In fact, Deputy Castleberry called for 
backup as soon as he had ascertained who was in the pickup truck, the first opportunity he 
had to return to his patrol car after assessing the situation (R. 102: 28-29). And any 
tardiness in calling for backup hardly establishes that the deputy was unconcerned for 
his safety. See State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah App. 1998) (trooper's 
reasonable concern for his safety precluded his asking defendant to retrieve registration 
and justified officer's looking through vehicle window for weapons). Cf. State v. Carter, 
707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985) (reasonableness standard, and not officer's actual lack of 
fear, determines basis for frisk). In any event, the circumstances themselves plainly 
justify a reasonable belief that the situation was potentially dangerous. 
15 
C This Court's decision in State v. James, distinguishing 
between a search for physical evidence and an investigation 
of a detainee, supports the deputy's actions. 
The deputy's retrieval of defendant's purse is further supported byJames, wherein this 
Court, based on the same "inherent safety concerns" identified in Class, held that an officer 
may require the occupants of a vehicle from to leave the vehicle based on reasonable 
suspicion of a traffic violation. James, 2000 UT 80, at ff 10-11, f 10 n.3 (citing Mimms, 434 
U.S. at 110-1 1, 98 S. Ct at 333, and Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,412-15,117 S. Ct 
882,885-86) (officer may order passenger from vehicle due to inherent danger in traffic stops, 
and observing "fact that there is more than one occupant of the vehicle increases the possible 
sources of harm to the officer"))-7 See also Rogala v. District of Columbia, 161 F.3d 44, 53 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) ("This Court concludes that in the circumstances presented, it follows from 
Maryland v. Wilson that a police officer has the power to reasonably control the situation by 
7
 Here, Deputy Castleberry's objective safety concern was real and reasonable. 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized the danger facing police 
during traffic stops. In Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,413,117 S. Ct. 882, 885 
(1997), the Supreme Court observed that '[i]n 1994 alone, there were 5,672 officer 
assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops." The Supreme Court has 
previously noted that approximately 30% of police shootings occur when an officer 
approaches a suspect seated in a vehicle. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. at 1049 n.13; see 
also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973) (FBI report indicates that 11 
of 35 police officers murdered in a three-month period were killed when the officers were 
making a traffic stop); 4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 9.5(a), 254-255 n.33 (3d. ed. 
1996) (more officers are shot while conducting field interrogations than while dealing 
with known felons, and 43% of officer shootings that occurred pursuant to a vehicle stop 
take place after the initial contact has been made). Utah law enforcement is not immune 
from the national trend. See, e.g., State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 81fi}2-5, 994 P.2d 177 
(passenger in traffic stop shot at officer after ignoring repeated requests to show his 
hands); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135,1137 (Utah 1989) (driver shot at officer without 
warning as officer approached vehicle). 
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requiring a passenger to remain in a vehicle during a traffic stop, particularly where, as here, 
the officer is alone and feels threatened."). Relevant to this case, this Court noted in James 
that the officer testified at the suppression hearing that he had some concerns for his safety 
because the high profile of the truck prevented him from observing what was taking place in 
the cab of the truck below his line of vision. Id. at f 3, n.l. More importantly, this Court 
rejected the argument that the officer's opening the door of James' truck to make contact with 
him was tantamount to a search for physical evidence, rather than a lawful request to 
investigate James himself. Id. at f 13. In essence, James was an expression of a well-
established view that an officer may control the space surrounding a suspect in order to safely 
investigate him. 
As in James, Deputy Castleberry's opening the front passenger door of defendant's 
vehicle was essentially an attempt to safely investigate defendant's identity while controlling 
the scene by the most minimal intrusion. Defendant did not challenge in the trial court and 
Neither in the trial court nor on direct appeal, did defendant challenge the opening of the 
driver's rear door to contact her about the underage, unlicensed minor in the driver's seat. 
Aplt. Br. in Ct. App. at 8. There is nothing in James that suggests that Deputy Castleberry 
could not as readily opened the front passenger door to contact defendant if his safety 
demanded it. When the deputy opened that door, he observed the bindle in plain view.8 
Moreover, at the point Deputy Castleberry discovered the unlicensed driver and 
8
 Deputy Castleberry did indicate that it was not until he was inside the vehicle 
that he saw the bindle (R. 102:36; Brake, 2002 UT App 190, at 1 5). However, this 
fact does not preclude that the bindle was in plain view merely upon opening the door, 
a finding unchallenged both in the trial court and on direct appeal (R. 60). 
17 
defendant's presence, the deputy had a reasonable basis to demand defendant's identification 
in aid of his investigation. See James, 2000 UT 80, at ^ 10. In response to Deputy 
Castleberry's request for her identification, defendant said it was in her purse, pointing to the 
front seat and offering to retrieve the purse for him (R. 102:17, 33, 35, 38). Instead, the 
deputy opened the front passenger door himself to retrieve the purse so that he could hand it 
to defendant, making sure that there were no weapons around the purse (R. 102:17-18, 35). 
As the court of appeals correctly observed, Deputy Castlebeny did not "root around" the 
interior of defendants vehicle or reach into any compartments or open containers: "*[T]he 
search was focused in its objective and no more intrusive than necessary to fulfill that 
objective.'" Brake, 2002 UT App 190, at % 26 (quoting Class, 475 U.S. at 118,106 S. Ct. at 
968). 
Notwithstanding the deputy's minimal and narrowly focused intrusion in circumstances 
justifying access to her identification, defendant insists that Deputy Castleberry's retrieval of 
the purse was a "weapons search." Aplt. Br. at 10-12 (citing State v. Bradford, 839 P.2d 866, 
870 (Utah App. 1992) (establishing that an officer may conduct a weapons search if he 
"reasonably believes a suspect is dangerous and may obtain immediate control of weapons")). 
In support, defendant also relies on State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989), and State 
v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446,454 (Utah 1996) (no reasonable suspicion for weapons search of 
gang member known to carry a weapon where loitering offense did not prompt concern for 
safety and detainee's conduct did not suggest presence of a weapon). 
As the court of appeals noted, Schlosser was inapplicable to this case because of 
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substantial differences in the concern for safety. Brake, 2002 UT App 190, at f 17. In 
Schlosser, the trooper stopped a speeding car and immediately opened the passenger side 
door, based on his belief that the passenger's fidgeting and turning signaled an attempt to hide 
something. Schlosser, 11A P.2d. at 1134,1134 n. 1. This Court rejected the State's argument 
that those facts justified a weapons search. Id. at 1137-38. The Court noted that the trooper 
(1) admitted that his immediately asking the passenger for identification was a pretense for 
trying to determine what the passenger might have been hiding, (2) scanned the interior of 
the car to search for evidence of criminal activity rather than to secure his safety, and (3) 
stated no safety concerns as a basis for his actions. Id. at 1134-37. As set out above and in 
contradistinction to Schlosser, Deputy Castleberry was expressly and reasonably concerned 
for his safety given the circumstances of the encounter. Brake, 2002 UT App 190, at f 25. 
Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that Schlosser was inapplicable to the case. Id. 
at ^ 17. 
In relying on Bradford m& Chapman, defendant fails to recognize a crucial distinction. 
In both cases, the investigating officer actually conducted a search for weapons wherever they 
might be in the defendant's vehicle and further detained the defendant to question him 
regarding weapons, Bradford, 839 P.2d at 868; Chapman, 921 P.2d at 448. In this case, the 
deputy in this case did not conduct a weapons search. Anticipating defendant's argument, the 
court of appeals wrote: 
Contrary to the dissent's conclusion, Castleberry neither requested nor 
conducted a weapons search of either the vehicle or the purse. Castleberry 
merely retrieved the purse from a dark area within the vehicle that was outside 
of his immediate control and sought to convey the purse to its owner. 
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Castleberry did not search the purse, and therefore, as we stated above, to the 
extent that Castleberfy's action constituted a search it was focused in its 
objective and no more intrusive than necessary. See New York v. Class, 475 
U.S. at 118,106 S. Ct. at 968. Ultimately, Castleberry's action helped to ensure 
not only his safety, but also the safety of those in the vehicle. 
Brake, 2002 UT App 190, at f27 n.5.9 
In sum, because the court of appeals recognized that the unique circumstances of this 
case properly called for the application of Class, and because this case is distinguishable in 
its unique circumstances from cases cited by defendant, this Court should uphold the court of 
appeals' decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ 7 day of July, 2003. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
9
 In support of her claim that the deputy's retrieval of the purse was a weapons 
search, defendant argues that Deputy Castleberry testified that he opened the front 
passenger door to retrieve the purse so that he could "make sure that there weren't any 
weapons." Aplt. Br. at 9 (citing R. 102:17-18, 35-36). The court of appeals' response, 
that "to the extent that [Deputy] Castleberry's action constituted a search it was focused 
in its objective and no more intrusive than necessary," is dispositive. Id. Moreover, the 
record cited fairly suggests that the deputy did not, in fact, search for weapons, but mereh 
reassured himself that in reaching only for the purse there were no weapons in its vicinity 
(R. 102:17-18). 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Appellee, 
v. 
Angie BRAKE, Appellant. 
No. 20010204-CA. 
May 31, 2002, 
After denial of her motion to suppress evidence of 
cocaine found in vehicle, defendant pled guilty in the 
Fourth District Court, Provo Department, Lynn W. 
Davis, J., to attempted possession of a controlled 
substance. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Thome, J., held that: (1) police officer's request for 
defendant's driver's license was justified and 
reasonable; (2) officer's concern for safety justified 
officer's warrantless entry into vehicle to retrieve purse; 
and (3) officer's retrieval of purse from vehicle, to 
extent action constituted a search, was minimally 
intrusive in furtherance of legitimate public safety 
concerns. 
Affirmed. 
Orme, J., dissented and filed an opinion. 
West Headnotes 
HI Criminal Law C=>1139 
1 IQkl 139 Most Cited Cases 
HI Criminal Law €=>1158(4) 
1 IQkl 158(4) Most Cited Cases 
In reviewing a motion to suppress, a trial court's factual 
findings are reviewed deferentially under the clearly 
erroneous standard, and its conclusions of law are 
reviewed for correctness with some discretion given to 
the application of the legal standards to the underlying 
factual findings. 
121 Arrest €=>63.5(9) 
35k63.5(9) Most Cited Cases 
Police officer's request for driver's license of vehicle 
owner who was sitting in back seat of the running 
vehicle parked on side of road was justified and 
reasonable, where officer had originally asked girl in 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim 
Pa^e 1 
driver's seat for a valid driver's license, but girl 
informed officer she was too young to have a driver's 
license and that the vehicle owner was sitting m the 
back seat. L'.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; U.C.A.1953. 
41-6-165,41-8-1(1). 
131 Searches and Seizures €=>65 
349k65 Most Cited Cases 
Police officer's warrantless entry into vehicle to retrieve 
occupant's purse from front passenger seat, upon being 
told by occupant, who was in back seat, that her 
identification was in purse, was justified in light of 
officer's concerns for his safety, and thus 
constitutionally permissible; officer was unable to see 
into backseat due to the darkness and fogged windows, 
there were a total of five individuals in two vehicles 
that appeared to be running, officer was in a desolate 
and high crime area, and purse was located in dark area 
out of his control. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 4. 
[41 Searches and Seizures C=»65 
349k65 Most Cited Cases 
To the extent that police officer's action constituted a 
search, officer's warrantless entry into vehicle to 
retrieve occupant's purse from front passenger seat, 
upon being told by occupant, who was in back seat, that 
her identification was in purse, was focused and 
minirnally intrusive in furthering legitimate public 
safety concern, and thus constitutionally permissible, 
where officer did not root through the interior of the 
vehicle, did not reach into any compartments, and did 
not open any containers. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
*32 Margaret P. Lindsay. Aldrich Nelson Weight & 
Esplin, Provo, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff. Attorney General, and Kenneth A. 
Bronston. Assistant Attorney General, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee. 
Before Judges BENCH. ORME, and THORNE. 
OPINION 
THORN K, Judge. 
f 1 Appellant Angie Brake (Brake) appeals from a 
conviction for Attempted Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. $ 58-37-8f2Va)fiHSuPD.1999). We affirm. 
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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BACKGROUND 
H 2 On January 29,2000, at approximately 11:45 p.m., 
Utah County Deputy Sheriff Neil Castleberry 
(Castleberry) observed two vehicles stopped in a small 
pullout on the side of the road west of the Geneva Steel 
plant, Castleberry pulled up behind the vehicles to 
inquire whether the occupants of either vehicle needed 
assistance. Because he was merely inquiring whether 
anyone needed assistance, Castleberry did not have his 
emergency lights on when he approached the vehicles. 
Castleberry, however, was aware that the vehicles were 
stopped in an area "known for frequent criminal 
activity." 
f 3 Upon exiting his vehicle, Castleberry approached 
one of the two vehicles, a green Nissan, which he 
believed had the engine running. Castleberry observed 
a young woman in the driver's seat. He asked the 
woman to roll down the window, which she did, and 
then he asked for her driver license. The woman told 
Castleberry that she was fifteen years-old and that she 
did not have a driver license. The woman also told 
Castleberry that she had not been driving the vehicle. 
Castleberry then inquired about the vehicle's owner, 
and the woman told him that the vehicle's owner was 
sitting in the backseat. 
f 4 Because the vehicle's windows were fogged, 
Casdeberry was unable to see clearly into the backseat 
He was able, however, to *33 see that two persons, a 
male and a female, were sitting in the backseat 
Because his vision was obscured, Castleberry opened 
the backseat door to speak to the two persons. Brake, 
who was sitting in the backseat, identified herself as 
both the vehicle's owner and the driver. Brake told 
Castleberry that she and the others, including the 
individuals in the other vehicle, were from Sanpete 
County. She also told Castleberry that she had 
changed seats with the fifteen-year-old when they 
arrived at their current location. 
f 5 Castleberry asked Brake for her identification. 
Brake told Castleberry that her identification was in her 
purse and pointed to the front passenger seat, where no 
one was sitting. Because the purse was located "in a 
dark area over which he h[ad] no control[,]" IFNlf 
Castleberry decided, for safety reasons, to retrieve the 
purse himself. Castleberry walked around to the 
passenger side of the front seat and opened the vehicle 
door to retrieve the purse. As Castleberry reached 
inside the vehicle to remove the purse, he saw, in plain 
view, a white bindle next to the purse near the vehicle's 
console. 
Copr.© West 2003 No 
FNL This quote comes from the trial court's 
Ruling on Motion to Suppress, % 10. 
1f 6 Castleberry picked up the purse and asked for its 
owner. Someone sitting in the Nissan told Castleberry 
that the purse belonged to "Lilly," and that she was 
sitting in the other vehicle. Castleberry took the purse 
and the bindle over to the other vehicle. He opened the 
vehicle's door and asked for Lilly. Castleberry also 
asked the persons sitting in the vehicle if the purse 
belonged to Lilly. One of the two persons identified 
herself as Lilly and told Castleberry that she owned the 
purse. Lilly, however, denied owning the bindle. 
Castleberry had Lilly exit the vehicle and continued to 
question her at his patrol car. He also tested the white 
powdery substance contained in the bindle, which 
tested positive for cocaine. 
j^ 7 Castleberry proceeded back to the Nissan and 
asked the three individuals who owned the cocaine. 
Castleberry received no response from them. Unable 
to determine who owned the cocaine, Castleberry told 
Brake that she would be arrested if no one claimed 
ownership because she owned the vehicle. Brake then 
admitted that the cocaine belonged to her and that she 
and the others had used the cocaine throughout the 
evening. Castleberry arrested Brake and called for 
backup. A subsequent search of the Nissan uncovered 
drug paraphernalia. 
f 8 Brake was bound over on charges of possessing a 
controlled substance and unlawful possession of drug 
paraphernalia. Brake subsequently filed a motion to 
suppress both the cocaine and her incriminating 
statements. 1FN21 The trial court denied Brake's 
Motion as it pertained to the admissibility of the 
cocaine and granted her Motion pertaining to her 
incriminating statements. 
FN2. Castleberry had questioned Brake before 
administering her Miranda warning. 
^ 9 In denying that portion of Brake's Motion to 
Suppress, the trial court concluded that opening the 
vehicle's front passenger door to retrieve the purse was 
justifiable under the officer safety exception to the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The trial 
court relied upon the following facts in reaching its 
decision: 
1. [Castleberry] was alone on patrol and had not yet 
called for backup. 
2. It was late at night; it was dark and none of the 
occupants lived in Utah County. 
3. The road is located in a remote area of Utah 
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County and... Castleberry described it as a "deserted 
road." 
4. There were two vehicles at the site with occupants 
in each (three occupants in the subject vehicle and 
two occupants in the pickup truck which was parked 
contiguous). 
5. This was an area of frequent criminal activity. 
6. [Castleberry's] vision was severely restricted 
because of the darkness and the fact that ail of the 
windows were fogged up. 
7. The other vehicle was running and... Castleberry 
testified he believed that the subject vehicle had the 
engine on with a fifteen-year-old unlicensed girl 
behind the wheel and two other passengers in the 
back seat. 
*34 % 10 As a result of the trial court's decision, Brake 
pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a controlled 
substance. She conditioned her plea on the right to 
appeal the trial court's partial denial of her Motion to 
Suppress. This appeal followed. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
jJJ f 11 Brake argues the trial court erred by denying 
that portion of her Motion to Suppress alleging that by 
opening the passenger door to obtain the purse, 
Castleberry's actions constituted an impermissible 
warrantless search. In reviewing a motion to suppress, 
"[a] trial court's factual findings are reviewed 
deferentially under the clearly erroneous standard, and 
its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with 
some discretion given to the application of the legal 
standards to the underlying factual findings." State v. 
Lova. 2001 UT ADD 3.«i6. 18 P.3d 1116. 
ANALYSIS 
r21f3If41 f 12 Brake argues that Castleberry conducted 
an impermissible warrantless search when he opened 
the Nissan's front passenger door to retrieve the purse, 
and therefore, violated her Fourth Amendment right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. To 
support her argument, Brake relies upon State v. 
Schlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 19891, 
f 13 In Schlosser^ a Utah Highway Patrol trooper 
stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation. See id. at 
1133. As the vehicle pulled to the side of the road, the 
trooper observed the defendant, a passenger in the 
vehicle, "bending forward, acting fidgety, turning to the 
left and to the right, and turning back to look at the 
[trooper].n M The movement drew the trooper's 
attention. 
f 14 After the vehicle stopped, the driver exited the 
vehicle, approached the trooper, and presented the 
trooper his license and registration. See id at 11 >V>4 
All the while, the trooper noticed that the defendant 
"continued to move about the cab of the truck." ki at 
1134. As a result of the defendant's behavior, the 
trooper concluded that the defendant "was trying to 
hide something." Id^ The trooper approached the 
passenger side of the vehicle, tapped on the window, 
and opened the door. See id. The trooper "scanned 
the interior of the truck for contraband and saw a bag of 
marijuana in the passenger door pocket." /J_ The 
trooper also "smelled marijuana smoke." A/ The 
trooper arrested both the defendant and the driver. 
% 15 The defendant moved to suppress the marijuana. 
fFN3] The trial court granted the defendant's motion 
and suppressed "all the evidence seized." /# The trial 
court concluded that the trooper "acted on 'a mere 
suspicion that the defendant... was engaged in criminal 
activity,' and had no legal basis for the search and 
seizure." ki (citation omitted). The State appealed. 
FN3. The defendant also moved to suppress 
drug paraphernalia and two firearms, which 
the trooper discovered while searching the 
vehicle. See id. 
% 16 The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's 
ruling. See id. at 1139. The court concluded that the 
trooper's opening the vehicle door was a "search." ki 
at 1135. The court also concluded that the search was 
unlawful. See id. at 1135-36. The court reasoned that 
[the trooper's] testimony established that his opening 
the car door exceeded the legitimate objectives of a 
traffic stop. The [trooper's] "clear initial objective" 
in opening the car door was to see whether [the 
defendant] was "hiding something." However, 
without probable cause to justify it, that act clearly 
exceeded the lawful scope of a legitimate government 
interest. 
ki 
% 17 Finally, the court explained that the trooper "cited 
no safety concerns as the basis for his actions; he 
sought only to investigate the possibility that 
defendants were engaged in illegal activity." Id. at 
1137. Because of the safety concerns in the present 
case, we conclude that Schlosser is inapplicable to the 
present matter. 
H 18 The facts and the reasoning set forth in New York 
v. Class. 475 U.S. 106. 106 S.Ct. 960. 89 L.Ed.Id 81 
(1986), are applicable to the present matter. In Class. 
the United *35 States Supreme Court held that a 
minimally intrusive warrantless search was justified in 
light of the Fourth Amendment protection against 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt Works 
Page 4 
unreasonable searches when balanced against concerns 
for police officer safety. See id at 117-18, 106S.Ct.at 
967- 68. 
119 In Class, police officers stopped the defendant for 
two traffic violations. See id. at 107-08. 106 S.Ct. at 
962. Upon stopping his vehicle, the defendant exited 
and approached one of the two officers conducting the 
stop. See id. at 108. 106 S.Ct. at 963. While one of 
the officers spoke with the defendant, the other officer 
proceeded to the defendant's vehicle and opened the 
door in an effort to locate the VIN number. See ki 
The officer was unable to locate the VIN number on the 
doorjamb, and, subsequently, he reached into the 
vehicle's interior to remove some papers that obscured 
the area of the dashboard where die VIN number was 
also located. See «/ Upon doing so, the officer saw a 
gun protruding from underneath the driver's seat. See 
uh The officers arrested the defendant See idL. 
f 20 The defendant filed a motion to suppress the gun, 
which the trial court denied. See UL. Ultimately, die 
New York Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, 
concluding that the officer's intrusion into the vehicle 
was a search that was not justified because the facts of 
the case " 'reveal no reason for the officer to suspect 
other criminal activity [besides the traffic infractions] 
or to protect his own safety/ " Id. at 109. 106 S.Ct. at 
963 (quoting State v. Class. 63 N.Y.2d 491. 483 
N.Y.?.2d 181t 472 N.E.2d 1Q09,101? (1984)). 
f 21 The United States Supreme Court reversed. The 
Court determined that "the governmental interest in 
highway safety served by obtaining the VIN is of the 
first order, and the particular method of obtaining die 
VIN here was justified by a concern for the officers' 
safety." Id. at 118. 106 S.Ct. at 968. The Court 
reasoned that "[t]he search was focused in its objective 
and no more intrusive than necessary to fulfill that 
objective." /# 
f 22 As a result, the Court held that 
this search was sufficiently unintrusive to be 
constitutionally permissible in light of the lack of 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN and the 
fact that the officers observed respondent commit two 
traffic violations. Any other conclusion would 
expose police officers to potentially grave risks 
without significantly reducing the intrusiveness of the 
ultimate conduct- viewing the VIN-which, as we 
have said, the officers were entitled to do as part of 
an undoubtedly justified traffic stop. 
Id at 119. 106 S.Ct. at 968. 
% 23 The Utah Supreme Court has held that a 
governmental interest exists in "removing unlicensed 
drivers from the road for public safety reasons." State 
V. Harmon. 910 P.2d 11%. 1203 (Utah MXHi 
(addressing the public safety concerns of individuals 
driving with a suspended license). Moreover, Utah 
Code Ann. §41-8*1(1) (1998) prohibits a person under 
sixteen years old from operating a motor vehicle. And, 
Utah Code Ann. §41 -6-165 (1998) makes it a crime for 
a vehicle's owner to allow an underage and unlicensed 
person to operate that vehicle. 1>'N41 Having 
discovered an underage and unlicensed individual at the 
wheel of a running vehicle, we conclude that it was 
both justifiable and reasonable for Castleberry to 
request from Brake, the vehicle's owner, her driver 
license "in light of the governmental interest in 
removing unlicensed drivers from the road for public 
safety reasons." Harmon. 910 P.2d at 1203. 
FN4. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-165 (I -»*). 
states "It is unlawful for the owner... o v 
vehicle ... knowingly to permit the oper. » 
of such vehicle upon a highway in any manr. -r 
contrary to law." Id. 
<f 24 Our conclusion that Castleberry was both justified 
and reasonable in his request to Brake, also leads this 
court to conclude that the United States Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Class, concerning police officer 
safety, is applicable in this matter. Specifically, in the 
situation facing Castleberry, he was justified in his 
decision to retrieve the purse. 
% 25 Castleberry approached two vehicles, both of 
which he believed to be running, in a desolate and 
frequent crime area. After he had encountered the 
Nissan's occupants, *36 Castleberry discovered that (1 
the individual in the Nissan's driver's seat was fifteen 
years-old and did not possess a driver license; (2) due 
to the darkness and fogged up windows, he was unable 
to see clearly into the Nissan's backseat to identify the 
passengers sitting in the backseat; (3) the individuals in 
both vehicles totaled five; and (4) the purse was 
located in a dark area out of his control. 
f 26 When Castleberry set out to retrieve the purse, 
"[t]he search was focused in its objective and no more 
intrusive than necessary to fulfill that objective." Class, 
475 U.S. at 118. 106 S.Ct at 968. As in Class. 
Castleberry did not "root about the interior of [Brake's 
vehicle]." hi. Further, "[Castleberry] did not reach into 
any compartments or open any containers." A/ 
Ultimately, Castleberry's "safety [and a legitimate 
public safety concern] wfere] served by the [minimal] 
governmental intrusion." Id. at 117. 106 S.Ct. at 968. 
The trial court's decision to deny Brake's Motion to 
Suppress, as it relates to Castleberry's retrieval of the 
purse, is dierefore affirmed. 1FN51 
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FN5. Contrary to the dissent's conclusion, 
Castleberry neither requested nor conducted a 
weapons search of either the vehicle or the 
purse. Castleberry merely retrieved the purse 
from a dark area within the vehicle that was 
outside of his immediate control and sought to 
convey the purse to its owner. Castleberry 
did not search the purse, and therefore, as we 
stated above, to the extent that Castleberry's 
action constituted a search it was focused in 
its objective and no more intrusive than 
necessary. See New York v. Class. 475 U.S. 
at 118. 106 S.Ct at 968. Ultimately, 
Castleberry's action helped to ensure not only 
his safety, but also the safety of those in the 
vehicle. 
f 27 I CONCUR: RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge. 
ORME, Judge (dissenting). 
f 28 Two facts, omitted from the main opinion, bear 
mention. First, the officer ostensibly set about to see 
if the occupants of the lawfully parked vehicles needed 
assistance even though nothing in the record suggests 
a trunk or hood was open, jacks and a spare tire were 
positioned by either vehicle, or emergency flashers 
were activated. Second, the officer expressly testified 
that he elected to open the one vehicle's front door and 
retrieve the purse so that he could "make sure that there 
weren't any weapons." [FN1] 
FN1. As pointed out in footnote 5 of the main 
opinion, the officer's purpose—to "make sure 
that there weren't any weapons"~was not 
disclosed to the occupants of the vehicle. 
Contrary to the claim in that footnote, 
however, the officer candidly admitted this 
was his purpose in entering the vehicle and 
retrieving the purse himself—this is not 
something I have created from whole cloth. 
The officer satisfied himself that there were no 
weapons in the area where he located the 
purse. It is true he did not search the purse, 
but at that point in time he had seen the bindle 
and the focus of the encounter had therefore 
dramatically changed. Moreover, the record 
does not disclose the size, shape, or weight of 
the purse. It is entirely possible the officer 
did not search the purse only because its size, 
shape, and weight were inconsistent with the 
possibility it contained a firearm. 
K 29 Utah law concerning the search of the interior of 
a vehicle for weapons, in the course of an investigatory 
stop, is clear. As explained in a series of cases, none 
of which are cited in the main opinion, an officer may 
conduct a weapons search only if he "reasonably 
believes a suspect is dangerous and may obtain 
immediate control of weapons." Stare v Bradford 839 
P.2d 866.870 (Utah Ct.Ann. 19921. This regimen also 
applies to traffic stops, even though they are regarded 
as potentially dangerous. See id at 869. Such a 
search is justified only if " fa reasonably prudent 
[person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the 
belief that his safety ... was in danger.' " State v. 
Rovbal 716 P.2d 291.293 (Utah 1986) (quoting Terry 
v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1. 27. 88 S.Ct. 1868. 1X83. 20 
L.Ed.2d 889 0968)). And such a belief can originate 
in the officer's contemporaneous observations- either 
of a weapon or of some furtive movements consistent 
with retrieval of a weapon-or in the inherent nature of 
the underlying offense. See State v Chapman 921 
P.2d 446,454 (Utah 1996V 
U 30 Thus, in Bradford^ a weapons search was 
permitted not because of a generalized safety concern 
or because the intrusion was deemed slight, but because 
the officer noticed the driver pull a black bag toward 
the front of the car from an area where the *37 officer 
earlier observed a rifle. See 839 P.2d at 871. And in 
State v. Stricklinz. 844 P.2d 979 (Utah CLADP. 1992). 
a weapons search was upheld where a vehicle's 
occupants were suspected of involvement in a burglary. 
See id. at 984 (noting" *[i]t is reasonable for an officer 
to believe that a burglar may be armed with weapons'") 
(quoting State v. Carter. 707 P.2d 656. 660 (Utah 
1985}). Conversely, in reversing this court in Chapman. 
the Utah Supreme Court held a weapons search was not 
warranted, even though the suspect was a gang member 
who had reputedly carried a weapon in the past, where 
" '[njothing about the nature of the underlying offense 
being investigated' "-i.e., parking on school property 
after hours-" 'prompted a concern for safety ... 
[and][n]othing defendant did, by way of conduct, 
attitude, or gesture, suggested the presence of a weapon 
in the vehicle.'" State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d 446. 454 
(Utah 1996) (quoting State v. Chapman. 841 P.2d 725. 
732 (Utah Ct.Apo.1992) (Orme, J., dissenting)). 
H 31 Applying the correct legal doctrine to this case, 
rather than the jurisprudence which has developed 
concerning law enforcement's entitlement to ascertain 
a vehicle identification number, leads to the opposite 
result from that reached by the majority. The officer 
did not see any weapons, nor does the record suggest he 
observed any furtive movements or other conduct 
consistent with the retrieval or presence of a weapon. 
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And nothing about a motorist possibly needing 
assistance, or even underage driving, by its very nature 
suggests the presence of weapons. It follows that the 
officer was not entitled to search even part of the 
interior of the vehicle for weapons while conducting his 
investigation of possible underage driving, and that all 
evidence found as a result of that search should have 
been suppressed. 
51 P.3d 31,448 Utah Adv. Rep. 16,2002 UT App 190 
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Defendant, Angie M. Brake, filed her Motion to Suppress on July 5,2000. A 
suppression hearing was conducted on August 7, 2000. Defendant was present and was 
represented by Mr. Paul Dewitt, Esq. Mr. David Clark, Deputy Utah County Attorney, 
represented the State of Utah. 
The matter was taken under advisement and the State of Utah was given time to file a 
memorandum. The State filed its Motion and Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress on August IS, 2000. 
The Court, having considered the testimony at the hearing, arguments of counsel, and 
legal memoranda, now finds and rules as follows: 
1. On January 29,2000, Deputy Castleberry of the Utah County Sheriffs Office was 
on patrol alone in an isolated area of Utah County on a road which goes along Utah Lake by the 
Lindon Boat Harbor and which is directly west of the Geneva Steel Plant. 
2. Officer Castleberry testified that this is an area that "has been known to frequent 
criminal activity." Transcript at page 33. 
3. It was a dark, cold winter night at approximately 11:45 p.m, when Officer 
Castleberry spotted two vehicles off the road. Officer Castleberry stopped to investigate and "to 
determine whether or not they needed assistance..." Transcript at page 15. One vehicle was a 
white pickup truck and the other was a Nissan passenger vehicle. 
4. He noted that both vehicles appeared to have occupants. The pickup truck was 
running and he thought the Nissan vehicle was probably running. 
5. The windows of the vehicle were fogged, making visibility inside the vehicle 
impossible. Castlebeny at 16(15-20). 
6. A fifteen-year-old girl was in the driver's seat of the vehicle while defendant was 
sitting in the rear seat with another passenger who had difficulty in understanding or 
communicating in English. Castlebeny at 17(1-15). 
7. Because it was past curfew, and a juvenile was present who was not licensed to 
drive the vehicle, Deputy Castlebeny sought identification from defendant who claimed to be the 
owner of the vehicle. Castlebeny at 17 (20). 
8. Deputy Castlebeny testified that his intentions were to warn the occupants of the 
curfew violation and in this case, "I would tell them they were only 15 minutes past curfew, it's 
time to be headed for home." But during the conversation he then learned that all the occupants 
were from San Pete County. He wanted further to check to see if anyone was licensed to drive 
the vehicle. Castlebeny at 37 (16-18). 
9. After talking with the juvenile in the driver's seat, Deputy Castlebeny then 
opened the rear door on the driver's side of the vehicle to speak with defendant because he was 
unable to see her through the window or from his vantage at the driver's open window. 
10. Officer Castlebeny asked defendant for identification. Defendant indicated or 
pointed to a purse in the front passenger seat. Officer Castlebeny testified that he decided to 
retrieve the license because it was located in a dark area over which he had no control 
Castlebeny at 17 (6-7). 
11. Officer Castlebeny, for safety reasons, then retrieved the purse himself. "I 
opened the door to reach in to retrieve what I believed to be her purse... As I reached for the 
purse, I noticed a small white bindle containing a white powdery substance sitting adjacent to the 
purse on the front seat/* The bindle was in plain view on the passenger seat between the purse 
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and the console. The purse on the front seat did not belong to the defendant. While her driver's 
license was ultimately obtained, it was not obtained from the purse on the front seat. Castleberry 
at 18 (18-22). 
12. Defendant's purse, containing her license, was located later by Officer Castleberry 
in the front passenger area of the vehicle. He could not recall whether it was in the glove 
compartment or the floor area, but was not on the front seat. 
13. Subsequent to entering the vehicle, finding the evidence, and seizing the drugs, 
Deputy Castleberry spoke with defendant regarding the alleged drugs he found. That questioning 
was conducted without giving defendant her Miranda warnings. Castleberry at 42 (9-11). 
14. Deputy Castleberry questioned defendant after finding the illegal drugs. He 
further testified that (1) he planned on arresting someone for the illegal drugs; (2) that person 
would be defendant if no one else claimed the drugs; and (3) that defendant was not free to leave 
during questioning. Castleberry at 41 (11-25) - 42 (1-8). 
15. Specifically, during the questioning of defendant, Miss Brake asked the deputy 
what was going to happen. Deputy Castleberry told her, "I said, if I cannot determine who owns 
the cocaine at this point inasmuch as you are the owner of the vehicle, you are responsible for 
what is inside your vehicle, that I would arrest you for possession of cocaine if no one came forth 
and claimed possession of h." Castleberry at 20 (21-25) - 21 (1-5). 
16. Officer Castleberry had called for backup and Officer Chipman arrived. He 
conducted a further search of the Nissan as Officer Castleberry continued his investigation and 
questioning of the occupants of both vehicles. 
17. Officer Chipman located, in plain view, a tin canister that had a straw in it and a 
razor blade. These items were located uup against the back window" of the Nissan near where 
the defendant was sitting. 
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ISSUES 
Defendant moves to suppress the evidence in this case because the search of the subject 
vehicle was conducted without a warrant and because statements by the defendant to Officer 
Castleberry were made without a Miranda warning. 
ISSUE NO. 1 
Was Sgt Castleberry's warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle, which took 
place when the officer opened the front passenger door of the defendant's vehicle, 
permissible and justified? 
The prosecution bears the burden of establishing a constitutionally recognized exception 
to the warrant requirement to substantiate a search. State v. Arrov, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). 
State v. Shoulderbladc. 905 P. 2d 289 (Utah, 1995). The State of Utah relies upon a Washington 
Court of Appeals case, State v. Grinier. 659 P.2d 550 (Wash. App. 1983), which stands for the 
proposition that "if circumstances either place the police in danger or create a risk of loss or 
destruction of evidence, a warrantless search is permissible." Id. at 552 (Emphasis added.) If this 
is a paramount rule of law, one would certainly think there would be a case out of this 
jurisdiction, and some case other than a Washington intermediate court of appeals to announce it. 
This Court has carefully reviewed the testimony regarding Deputy Castleberry's 
decision to retrieve defendant's driver's license as contained in direct examination (Transcript, 
page 17, line 10 - 25; page 18, line 1 - 22) and cross examination (Transcript, page 33, lines 14-
25, and page 34, page 35, page 36, lines 1 - 25). Copies are attached. 
Officer Castleberry testified that he intended to retrieve the purse out of a sense of 
personal safety and to inspect the purse/area for weapons. Did he have sufficient justification to 
be concerned? These are the "officer safety" facts: 
1. He was alone on patrol and had not yet called for backup. 
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2. It was late at night; it was very dark and none of the occupants lived in Utah 
County. 
3. The road is located in a remote area of Utah County and Officer Castleberry 
described it as a "deserted road." 
4. There were two vehicles at the site with occupants in each, (three occupants in 
the subject vehicle and two occupants in the pickup truck which was parked contiguous.) 
5. This was an area of frequent criminal activity. 
6. His vision was severely restricted because of the darkness and the fact that all of 
the windows were fogged up. 
7. The other vehicle was running and Officer Castleberry testified he believed the 
subject vehicle had the engine on with a fifteen-year-old unlicensed girl behind the wheel and two 
other passengers in the back seat. 
Ultimately would it have been permissible for Officer Castleberry to shine a flashlight 
through the passenger window for safety purposes? Yes. Then, since the window was fogged 
and severely restricted his vision, was he then justified to open the door? It is the opinion of the 
Court that under these circumstances the Officer was justified in opening the passenger door. 
When he did so the bindle of drugs was in plain view. Inevitably the drugs may have been 
discovered even if the defendant had retrieved the purse because the purse did not belong to her 
and presumably did not contain her license. 
The Mirqiict ruling clarified factors to be considered by a Court in assessing whether a 
defendant is in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
The standard for determining when a defendant is "in custody" for 
Miranda purposes is well settled. The safeguards prescribed by Miranda 
become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 
degree associated with formal arrest. More specifically, Miranda warnings are 
required whenever the circumstances of an interrogation are such that they 
exert upon the detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free 
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exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned 
of his constitutional rights. 
The "not free to leave" standard, on the other hand, determines whether 
a person has been "seized" under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. That standard is broader than the Miranda standard. A person 
mav be "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes but not be "in custody" for 
Fifth Amendment purposes. Whether one is "in custody for Miranda 
purposes depends on an objective assessment of the circumstances of the 
interrogation with respect to the compulsory nature of the interrogation rather 
than on the subjective intent or suspicions of the officers conducting the 
examination. 
In the context of a routine traffic stop, the driver and the passengers, 
even though they have been stopped and, at least momentarily, are not free to 
leave, are not "in custody" for Miranda purposes. That is true even though an 
officer engages in some degree of accusatory questioning of the driver during 
the course of the stop and even though the officer may have a subjective, 
unstated intent to arrest the driver... 
To guide the decision as to when one is in custody and entitled to a 
Miranda warning prior to a formal arrest, Salt Lake Citv v. Carner. 664 P.2d 
1168 (Utah 1983), set out four factors to be evaluated: 1) the site of the 
interrogation; 2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; 3) whether 
the objective indicia of arrest were present; and 4) the length and form of the 
interrogation"... 
In holding that Mirquet was in custody, the Court of Appeals, applying 
the Carner factors, found that 1) the site of the interrogation was inside the 
police car; 2) Officer Mangeison's investigation focused solely on defendant; 
3) the objective indicia of arrest were present; 4) the form of the interrogation 
evidenced a clear coercive intent on the part of the officer to prompt Mirquet 
to produce incriminating contraband; and 5) the place of the interrogation 
added to the coercive environment. 
The facts support both these subordinate conclusions and the ultimate 
conclusion that the defendant was "in custody." Id at 1146, 47 & 48. 
(Emphasis added). 
ISSUE NO. 2 
At what point was the defendant in custody and the subject of an interrogation 
as to require the officer to administer Miranda warnings to the defendant? 
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Both sides rely upon the case of State v. Mirquet. 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1996). This 
Court must apply the law contained in Mirquet to the facts of this case. The scenario of facts 
presented by the State of Utah in its briefing seems to rely upon the officer's report, which is not 
in evidence. The Court must rely upon the testimony at the hearing. 
Likewise, the defendant relies upon ufacts" that are not in evidence, such as "the 
defendant was not experienced or knowledgeable regarding criminal procedure and the defendant 
had never been arrested prior to this incident and had no criminal record." These facts are not in 
evidence. Defense argues that Ms. Brake's "inexperience with the criminal justice system" 
together with other circumstances mandate that the Miranda warning should have been prior to 
interrogation. 
Defendant further argues that a reasonable person in Miss Brake's shoes (knowledge, 
experience, and understanding) would believe that they were the subject of a custodial 
interrogation by Deputy Castleberry. While that might be a correct statement of the law, there is 
absolutely no testimony or evidence in the case respecting Ms. Brake's knowledge, experience 
and understanding or her "Inexperience with the criminal justice system." She did not testify at 
the hearing and certainly there is no evidence that Deputy Castleberry knew about or inquired 
about her past criminal history, past drug use or her knowledge of the criminal justice system or 
legal procedure. That would not have been permissible. 
In the case at bar, Officer Castleberry observed a white plastic bindle on the passenger 
side front seat immediately after he opened the front door. He picked it up and asked who owned 
it, to which no one responded. The bindle was next to a purse. When the officer asked who 
owned the purse, the defendant, Ms. Brake or others, responded that the purse belonged to a 
young woman in the second vehicle, the white truck. While Castleberry was speaking with this 
young woman, a backup officer, Deputy Chipman, arrived and Castleberry directed him to search 
the defendant's vehicle. As Officer Chipman was searching the defendant's vehicle, Castleberry 
spoke with several individuals including the defendant, Ms. Brake. He checked for signs of 
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cocaine use in various individuals and testified: "It appeared to me that all of the individuals that I 
looked at exhibited signs of having used cocaine/' 
No one was "free to leave" while the officer asked questions. Applying the 
Mirquet/Carner test the Court finds: 
1. The questioning took place at the remote site in Officer Castleberry's patrol 
vehicle; 
2. The investigation focused on all of the individuals in the two vehicles; 
3. There was no objective indicia of arrest; no handcuffing, no one being constrained 
in a vehicle; no formal "you are under arrest" directive. In addition, there was nothing said which 
attempted to coerce her or prompt her to retrieve incriminating evidence. 
4. The investigation was quite short and there was no coercive or accusatory 
statements. 
Accordingly, applying the four-pronged test, the Court does not find that Ms. Brake had 
been "deprived of her freedom in any significant way" for purposes of Miranda warnings. But 
once she had admitted "the specific bindie was hers in addition to any cocaine that - the residue 
that was found within the box.. ." the Miranda was implicated. It was not given at that stage and 
should have been. 
RULING 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress is granted in part and denied in part. Counsel for the 
State of Utah is directed to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
The Clerk of the Court is instructed to calendar this case in order to set a jury trial. 
Dated this / ' day of October, 2000. ^ ^ S | M £ ^ V 
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